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Abstract 
Currently, evidence on the ‘resource curse’ yields a conundrum. While there is much cross-
section evidence to support the curse hypothesis, time series analyses using vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models have found that commodity booms raise the growth of 
commodity exporters. This paper adopts panel cointegration methodology to explore longer 
term effects than permitted using VARs. We find strong evidence of a resource curse. 
Commodity booms have positive short-term effects on output, but adverse long-term effects. 
The long-term effects are confined to “high-rent”, non-agricultural commodities. We also find 
that the resource curse is avoided by countries with sufficiently good institutions. We test the 
channels of the resource curse proposed in the literature and find that it is explained by real 
exchange rate appreciation and public and private consumption. Our findings have important 
implications for non-agricultural commodity exporters with weak institutions, especially in 
light of the current unprecedented boom in global commodity prices.    
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1. Introduction 
A large literature suggests that there is a ‘resource curse’: natural resource abundant 
countries tend to grow slower than resource scarce countries.4 However, whereas the 
resource curse literature predicts a negative effect of commodity booms on growth, 
empirical studies by Deaton and Miller (1995) for Africa and Raddatz (2007) for low-
income countries find quite the contrary: commodity booms significantly raise 
growth. The current African growth acceleration coincident with the commodity 
boom that began in 2000 is clearly consistent with these findings. 
The resource curse literature and the studies of the effects of commodity prices use 
different methodologies, but both suffer from acknowledged limitations. The former 
is largely reliant upon cross-sectional growth regressions in which average growth 
over recent decades is regressed on a measure of resource abundance and a selection 
of control variables.5 This methodology does not consider commodity prices and is 
unable to disentangle the dynamics of the resource curse. It is therefore not well-
suited for testing the wide range of proposed channels in the theoretical resource curse 
literature. Further, cross-sectional growth regressions suffer from potential omitted 
variable bias and it is therefore “crucial to move from cross-country to panel data 
evidence” (Van der Ploeg, 2007). However, the approach pioneered by Deaton and 
Miller (1995), namely vector autoregressive (VAR) models, cannot address long-run 
effects. It is therefore possible that the positive short-run effects are offset by a 
subsequent resource curse beyond the horizon of the VAR models: the post-2000 
upturn would be a false dawn. In this paper we adopt panel cointegration 
methodology to analyze global data for 1963 to 2003 to disentangle the short and long 
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 This empirical finding is documented in amongst others Sachs and Warner (1995a, 2001), Gylfason et al. (1999), and Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian (2003). Van der Ploeg (2007) provides a survey of the resource curse literature. Alexeev and Conrad 
(forthcoming) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue that contrary to the claims made in the literature, natural resources 
positively affect growth. 
5
 Manzano and Rigobon (2006) use panels with two or four time series observations and find that the resource curse effect 
disappears once one allows for fixed effects.  
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run effects of commodity prices on growth. Panel data allow for the inclusion of 
country-specific fixed effects, which effectively control for all unobservable time-
invariant country characteristics. In addition, the use of panel data allows for a much 
larger sample size, as it exploits the within-country variation in the regression 
variables. We also include regional time dummies, further reducing concerns of 
omitted variable bias, and we allow the effects of commodity prices to vary across 
different types of commodities. We investigate all the transmission channels of the 
resource curse proposed in the literature in a systematic manner and we address 
potential sources of endogeneity that have sometimes been neglected in previous 
literature. 
We find strong evidence in support of the resource curse hypothesis. In particular, 
commodity booms have positive short-term effects on output, but adverse long-term 
effects. The long-term effects are confined to “high-rent”, non-agricultural 
commodities. Within this group, we find that the resource curse is avoided by 
countries with sufficiently good institutions. When testing the importance of the 
transmission channels, we find that real exchange rate appreciation, public and private 
consumption, and to a lesser extent external debt, manufacturing, and services, 
explain the curse.    
Our findings have important implications for non-agricultural commodity exporters 
with weak institutions, many of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. They point 
at the post-2000 boom in global commodity prices as an important determinant of the 
recent growth acceleration in Africa’s commodity exporting economies. But they also 
suggest that the commodity boom is, if past behaviour is repeated, likely to have 
strongly adverse long-term effects, making the recent growth acceleration particularly 
misleading. However, if our tentative diagnosis of the root cause of the resource curse 
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as being due to errors in governance is correct, then this prognosis could be avoided 
by improvements in the quality of governance.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical 
analysis. Section 3 reports the estimation results and simulates the short and long run 
effects of higher commodity export prices on growth. Section 4 investigates whether 
the resource curse occurs conditional on governance. Section 5 deals with the 
endogeneity of resource dependence and governance. Section 6 tests the importance 
of the proposed transmission channels. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Empirical Analysis 
In this section we describe our econometric model and the variables used in 
estimation. Data description and sources can be found in Appendix A. Panel unit root 
and panel cointegration tests are discussed in Appendix B. The short-run and long-run 
effects of commodity export prices on GDP per capita are analyzed using the 
following error-correction model: 
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for i = 1,…N and t = 1,…T , where tiy ,  is log real GDP per capita in country i in year 
t, iα is a country-specific fixed effect, and tiz ,  is an rT × 1 vector of regional time 
dummies, where r is the number of regions.6 1, −tix  is an m × 1 vector of m variables 
that are expected to affect GDP both in the short run and long run.  
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 The country-specific fixed effect captures all the time-invariant characteristics of the individual countries, which eliminates the 
possibility of omitted variable bias due to time-invariant unobserved variables. The vector of regional time dummies captures 
year-specific fixed effects for each of the following geographical regions: (i) Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, (ii) 
East Asia and Pacific and Oceania, (iii) Latin America and Caribbean, (iv) North Africa and Middle East, (v) South Asia, (vi) 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and (vii) Western Europe and North-America. This categorization is based on the country classifications of 
the World Bank and the United Nations, and on the online Central and Eastern European Directory.   
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We include a constructed commodity export price index to test the effect of 
commodity export prices. To investigate whether the effects vary across different 
types of commodities, we also experiment with sub-indices for non-agricultural and 
agricultural commodities. We also include an oil import price index to control for the 
effect of oil prices on oil importing countries, and three control variables taken from 
the empirical growth literature: trade openness, measured as the ratio of trade to GDP; 
inflation, measured as the log of 1 plus the annual consumer price inflation rate; and 
international reserves over GDP. Clearly, the selection of control variables is an 
important issue. As we show, our results are robust to the wide range of additional or 
alternative controls used in the literature, including indicators of institutional quality, 
exchange rate overvaluation, external debt, income inequality, commodity price 
volatility, industrial development, public, private, and total investment, public and 
private consumption, democracy, capital account openness, the black market 
premium, the number of assassinations, and an alternative measure of trade openness. 
These variables are not included in our preferred specification because they were 
either not robustly significant or severely lowered the number of observations in our 
sample.7 Finally, tis ,  is an n × 1 vector of n control variables that are expected to 
have only a short-run effect on growth and includes indicators that capture civil war, 
the number of coup d’etats, and the number of large natural disasters (geological, 
climatic, and human disasters). Our dataset consists of all countries and years for 
which data are available, and covers around 130 countries between 1963 and 2003. 
Table 1a reports summary statistics for the variables used in estimation.  
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 We include most of them in section 6, when we investigate the transmission channels of the resource curse. The results for the 
other variables are available upon request. The growth literature also uses a number of time-invariant variables, such as 
indicators of geography. However, any effect of these variables is already captured by the country-specific fixed effect.   
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2.1 Constructing commodity price indices 
The commodity export price index was constructed using the methodology of Deaton 
and Miller (1995) and Dehn (2000). We collected data on world commodity prices 
and commodity export values for as many commodities as data availability allowed. 
Table 1b lists the 50 commodities in our sample. For each country, we calculate the 
total 1990 value of commodity exports. We construct weights by dividing the 
individual 1990 export values for each commodity by this total. These 1990 weights 
are then held fixed over time and applied to the world price indices of the same 
commodities to form a country-specific geometrically weighted index of commodity 
export prices. To allow the effect of commodity export prices to be larger for 
countries with larger exports, we weight the log of the deflated index by the share of 
commodity exports in GDP. The separate indices for non-agricultural and agricultural 
commodities were constructed in the same way. The oil import price index was 
constructed by interacting the log of the deflated oil price index with a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if a country is a net oil importer and zero otherwise. 
 
3. Estimating the short and long run effects of commodity prices 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (1).8 The first specification includes 
the commodity export price index. The long-run coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at 1 percent, consistent with a long-run resource curse effect. 
Higher commodity export prices significantly reduce the long-run level of real GDP 
in commodity exporting countries. We next investigate whether this adverse long-run 
effect is common to all the commodities in our index. We decompose the general 
commodity export price index into two sub-indices: one for non-agricultural 
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 The long-run coefficients correspond to 1•)/1(- βλ  in equation (1). The short-run coefficients correspond to 
4 and ,3,2, βββλ in equation (1). 
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commodities only and one for agricultural commodities only. Table 2, column (2), 
shows the results when we replace the general index in column (1) by the two sub-
indices. For non-agricultural commodities we again find strong evidence of an 
adverse long-run effect. The coefficient is negative and again statistically significant 
at 1 percent.9 By contrast, the coefficient for agricultural commodity export prices is 
positive and insignificant. This suggests that higher agricultural export prices are not a 
curse analogous to non-agricultural commodities: on the contrary, they are more 
likely than not to be beneficial.  
Table 2, column (3), reports the results when adding the regional time dummies to 
the specification of column (1). The coefficient of the commodity export price index 
again enters negative and is statistically significant at 1 percent. The coefficient is 
slightly smaller than in column (1) but implies a substantial long-run resource curse 
effect. Figure 1a shows this effect as a function of a country’s dependence upon 
commodity exports. An example of a highly commodity-dependent country is 
Zambia. In 1990 Zambia’s commodity exports represented 35 percent of its GDP. The 
results in Figure 1a therefore predict a long-run elasticity of -0.44.10 In other words, a 
10 percent increase in the price of Zambian commodity exports leads to a 4.4 percent 
lower long-run level of GDP per capita. These results clearly suggest the existence of 
a long-run resource curse. We should note that a reduction in constant-price GDP is 
not the same as a reduction in real income. The higher export price directly raises real 
income for a given level of output and this qualitatively offsets the decline in output. 
The magnitude of this benefit from the terms of trade follows directly from the change 
in the export price and the share of exports in GDP. Thus, in the example of Zambia 
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 Given the economic importance of oil, we experimented with a further decomposition of non-agricultural commodities into oil 
and other non-agricultural commodities. An F-test on the coefficients of these two sub-indices did not reject the null hypothesis 
of equal coefficients. This suggests that we can analyze oil and other non-agricultural commodities as a common aggregate.   
10
 Recall that the commodity export price index is weighted by the share of commodity exports in GDP. So for Zambia, the long-
run elasticity equals the long-run coefficient, -1.243, multiplied by Zambia’s share of commodity exports in GDP, 0.35.  
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above, the terms of trade gain directly raises income by 3.5 percent for given output. 
Even so, this is less than the decline in output of 4.4 percent, so that the resource curse 
ends up reducing both output and income relative to counterfactual.   
When replacing the general index by the sub-indices in column (4), the results are 
also similar to before. The coefficient of the non-agricultural commodity export price 
index enters negative and is again significant at 1 percent. The effect is substantial. 
For a country like Nigeria, which in 1990 had non-agricultural exports that 
represented 35 percent of its GDP (almost exclusively oil), the results predict a long-
run elasticity of -0.49. In other words, a 10 percent increase in the price of oil leads to 
a 4.9 percent lower long-run level of Nigeria’s GDP per capita. The coefficient of the 
agricultural commodity export price index enters negative but is insignificant, which 
is consistent with the absence of a resource curse effect for agricultural commodities. 
Having discussed the long-run effects of commodity export prices, we now turn to 
the other variables in our model. To save space, we only discuss the results in Table 2, 
column (3). First, the three long-run control variables are statistically significant and 
enter with the expected signs. Trade to GDP and reserves to GDP enter with a positive 
sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that countries with 
higher levels of trade liberalization and international reserves tend to have higher 
long-run GDP levels. Inflation enters negative and is significant at 5 percent, 
suggesting that higher inflation leads to a lower long-run GDP level. The oil import 
price index, which was included to control for the effect of oil prices on oil importing 
countries, enters with the expected negative sign but is not statistically significant.  
The short-run GDP determinants also enter with the expected sign. The 
contemporaneous as well as the first and second lag of the change in the commodity 
export price index enter positive. This effect is largest and statistically significant at 1 
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percent for the first lag. These results indicate that an increase in the growth rate of 
commodity export prices has a positive short-run effect on GDP growth. Thus, the 
short-run dynamics of a commodity boom are quite contrary to the long-run effects. 
Figure 1b illustrates the short-run effect by showing the impulse response functions of 
an increase in the growth rate of commodity export prices for different levels of 
commodity exports to GDP. The effect of a 10 percentage points increase in prices in 
period t cumulates to 0.17 percentage points of GDP growth after year t+1 in 
countries with commodity exports that represent 10 percent of their GDP. This growth 
gain amounts to 0.34, 0.51, and 0.68 percentage point for countries with commodity 
exports to GDP shares of 20, 30 and 40 percent, respectively. The positive short-run 
effect of commodity export prices is consistent with the findings in Deaton and Miller 
(1995) and Raddatz (2007).11 Further, the short run effects on output are reinforced by 
the direct gain in income through the improvement in the terms of trade, so that real 
incomes rise strongly.  
Table 2, column (3), also reports the coefficients of the other short-run GDP 
determinants. The coefficient of lagged GDP per capita is negative and significant at 1 
percent. The size of the coefficient suggests that the speed of adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium is 6.2 percent per year. The first lag of the dependent variable enters 
positive and is also significant at 1 percent. We experimented with additional lags but 
found that these are unimportant. The lagged changes of trade to GDP, inflation and 
reserves have the expected signs but are not significant.12 An increase in the oil price 
has a negative effect on growth in oil importing countries in the same year and the 
second subsequent year, and a positive effect on growth in the first subsequent year, 
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 Raddatz (2007) documents that a 14 percent increase in commodity export prices results in a 0.9 percent increase in GDP after 
four years. Both Raddatz (2007) and Deaton and Miller (1995) do not distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of 
commodity prices.  
12
 We do not include the contemporaneous changes in order to limit concerns of endogeneity.   
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although these effects are not significant.13 Next, the two political shocks, coups and 
civil wars have unsurprisingly large and highly significant adverse effects on growth. 
A coup appears to cut growth by around 3.1 percentage points in the same year, while 
the negative impact of civil war is estimated to be 2.2 percentage points for each year 
of the war, consistent with Collier (1999). We investigated whether this varies during 
the course of the war but could find no significant effect. Finally, natural disasters 
significantly reduce growth by 0.4 percentage points.  
 
4. The resource curse conditional on governance 
The results in the previous section point indirectly at governance as being important 
in explaining the resource curse. This is because of the sharp distinction we have 
found between the agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. This distinction 
closely corresponds to whether or not the activity generates rents. Agricultural 
commodities can be produced in many different locations and so competitive entry 
will drive profits to normal levels. The rents on land used for export crops should 
therefore be no higher than that used for other crops, once allowance is made for 
differences in investment, such as the planting of trees. In contrast, the non-
agricultural commodities are all extractive, the feasibility of production being 
dependent upon the presence of the resource in the ground. Hence, the extractive 
industries all generate rents as a matter of course. Mehlum et al. (2006) and Robinson 
et al. (2006) argue that these rents lead to rent-seeking and inefficient redistribution in 
countries with weak “grabber-friendly” governance but not in countries with strong 
“producer-friendly” governance. This suggests that the resource curse occurs 
conditional on weak governance.  
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 Even though the changes in the oil import price index are not significant, we include them because the commodity export price 
index also enters with up to two lags.  
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To investigate this possibility we split the countries in our sample in two groups 
according to their mean International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) composite risk 
rating between 1984 and 2002.14 The ICRG is a commercial rating service whose 
continued viability has been dependent upon client firms regarding it as having value. 
There is therefore some reasonable presumption that it has informational content. The 
first group, which for convenience we will call the “good governance” group, consists 
of the countries with a mean ICRG score of 75 or higher. This group contains 
countries like Australia, Canada, and Norway, but also Botswana. The second “bad 
governance” group consists of the countries with a mean ICRG score below 75 and 
contains for example Venezuela, Libya and Nigeria.  
We next investigate whether the long-run effect of commodity export prices differs 
between the good governance and bad governance countries. We begin with the 
composite index and then focus on the decomposition into agricultural and non-
agricultural commodities since it is only the latter where we find evidence of the 
resource curse. We introduce governance by adding an interaction term of the 
commodity price index with a dummy that takes a value of 1 for good governance 
countries and 0 for bad governance countries to the specifications in Table 2. The 
results are reported in Table 3.15 In column (1) the commodity export price index 
enters negative and is statistically significant at 1 percent, indicating that there is 
indeed a long-run resource curse effect for countries with bad governance. The 
interaction term of the index with the good governance dummy enters positive but at 
this stage is not statistically significant.  
In Table 3, column (2), we again decompose the general commodity export price 
index into sub-indices for non-agricultural and agricultural commodities. As 
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 Since the ICRG is an ordinal variable it is best introduced into the quantitative analysis through a threshold. 
15
 We restrict the sample to countries for which the mean ICRG score is available. As a result, the number of observations drops 
from 3608 to 3087. 
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previously, the direct effect of the non-agricultural export price index enters negative 
and is statistically significant at 1 percent, suggesting that badly governed countries 
suffer from an adverse long-run effect of higher non-agricultural commodity prices. 
However, the interaction term of the index with the good governance dummy enters 
positive and is now statistically significant at 1 percent. This indicates that the long-
run effect of non-agricultural export prices is different for good governance countries. 
For such countries the net long-run effect is given by the linear combination of the 
two coefficients, which is positive and significant at 5 percent. This suggests that far 
from suffering from a resource curse, countries with good governance succeed in 
transforming commodity booms into sustainable higher output. These findings 
support the hypothesis that the resource curse occurs conditional on bad governance. 
The agricultural index enters positive and is insignificant, while its interaction with 
good governance enters negative but is also insignificant. This indicates that the 
effects of higher agricultural export prices in countries with good and bad governance 
are not significantly different. It also supports our earlier finding that higher 
agricultural export prices do not lead to any long-run resource curse effect.  
Table 3, columns (3) and (4), report the results when adding the regional time 
dummies to the specifications of columns (1) and (2). The results are very similar. In 
column (3), the general commodity export price index again enters negative and is 
significant at 1 percent, while its interaction with good governance is again positive 
but is now significant at 1 percent. In column (4), the non-agricultural index enters 
with a negative sign and is significant at 1 percent, while its interaction with the good 
governance dummy enters positive and is also significant at 1 percent. These results 
strongly support the findings in columns (1) and (2) and clearly show that the resource 
curse occurs in badly governed countries but not in countries with good governance. 
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The agricultural commodity export price index enters positive but is insignificant, 
while its interaction enters negative and is also insignificant, as in column (2).  
We next investigate the robustness of these results by rerunning the specifications in 
Table 3 using the initial 1985 composite ICRG scores rather than the average scores.16 
The results are very similar. In particular, the results for the composite index and the 
two sub-indices are robust to using this alternative measure of governance. 
Finally, to further explore the non-linear effect of non-agricultural commodity 
export prices, Table 4 reports the results of separate regressions for the countries with 
bad governance and the countries with good governance. Columns (1) and (3) show 
the results for the sub-sample of bad governance countries when excluding and 
including regional time dummies, respectively. In both cases the non-agricultural 
index enters with a negative sign and is significant at 1 percent. This is consistent with 
the earlier finding of a resource curse for countries with bad governance. Table 4, 
columns (2) and (4), show the results for the sub-sample of countries with good 
governance. In both cases, the non-agricultural index now enters positive. In the 
specification of column (2) this effect is statistically significant at 5 percent. Not only 
is the resource curse effect absent in countries with good governance, the long-run 
effect of higher export prices is now positive, as one would expect. The effect is also 
economically significant. For a country like Norway, which in 1990 had non-
agricultural commodity exports that represented 15 percent of its GDP, the results in 
Table 4, columns (2) and (4), predict a long-run elasticity of around 0.23. In other 
words, a 10 percent increase in the price of non-agricultural commodities leads to a 
2.3 percent higher long-run level of Norway’s GDP per capita.17 These results provide 
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 The first year for which ICRG scores are available is 1984 but the coverage is better for 1985. Given that 1984 and 1985 scores 
are highly correlated (> 0.98), we use 1985 scores. We again separate the countries into “good governance” (1985 ICRG score > 
69.5 (Portugal)) and “bad governance” (1985 ICRG score ≤ 69.5). The proportion of good governance countries is equal across 
the average ICRG and 1985 ICRG samples (21%).  
17
 The results in Table 4 are robust to using the initial 1985 composite ICRG scores instead of the average scores. 
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strong evidence that the resource curse occurs conditional on bad governance. 
Countries with sufficiently good governance do not suffer from the curse, and instead 
benefit from higher commodity prices, both in the short run and in the long run. 
 
5. The endogeneity of resource dependence and governance 
A possible concern with the results in the previous sections is that the commodity 
export price indices are endogenous, i.e. correlated with the error term in equation (1). 
As argued by Deaton and Miller (1995), one of the advantages of using international 
commodity prices is that they are typically not affected by the actions of individual 
countries. Also, by keeping the weights constant over time, supply responses to price 
changes are excluded from the analysis. Nonetheless, countries that are major 
exporters of one or more commodities may have an influence on the world price of 
those commodities, which could lead to biased estimates. To address this concern, we 
express each country’s exports of a given commodity as a share of the total world 
exports of that commodity and repeat this for all other commodities in our sample. 
This yields a list of commodity export shares that reflect the importance of individual 
exporters in the global markets for individual commodities. We found that of the 129 
countries in our sample, 22 countries export at least one commodity for which their 
share in world exports exceeds 20 percent. We investigate whether the inclusion of 
these major exporters in our sample affected our results by re-estimating the 
specifications in Tables 2 and 3 but without these 22 countries. The results, available 
upon request from the authors, show that our findings are strongly robust to the 
exclusion of major exporters of individual commodities. In particular, the long-run 
coefficients for the commodity export price index and the non-agricultural commodity 
export price index and their interactions with good governance in the specifications of 
 15 
Tables 2 and 3 are very similar to the original coefficients and are always significant 
at 1 percent. The short-run positive effects of commodity prices are strongly robust as 
well. Hence, our results do not seem to be biased by countries that are major exporters 
of one or more commodities and that may influence world prices of these 
commodities.18  
In addition to world commodity prices, the ratio of commodity exports over GDP is 
also potentially endogenous. As explained in section 2.1, we weight the commodity 
price indices by this ratio, which could lead to omitted variable or reverse causality 
bias.19 Consider two resource-rich countries: one which has suffered from bad 
policies, slow growth, and a lack of industrialization, and one which has benefited 
from good policies, fast growth, and industrialization. The bad policy country will 
have a higher commodity exports to GDP ratio due to the lack of development of its 
non-resource sectors. This implies that the estimated effect of higher commodity 
prices on growth in our estimations could be (partly) due to the higher weights we 
attach to countries with a poor growth record.   
To address this concern we need to instrument for the ratio of non-agricultural 
commodity exports to GDP, these being the commodities that appear to generate the 
resource curse. As an instrument, we use the 2000 value of sub-soil assets (minerals) 
in current US dollars per capita developed by the World Bank (2006).20 The estimates 
are based on the net present value of a country’s expected benefits over a horizon of 
20 years and include 13 commodities, 12 of which are included in our non-
agricultural index. The ratio of non-agricultural commodity exports over GDP does 
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 We repeated this robustness check using a threshold of 10 percent instead of 20 percent. 34 out of the 129 countries export at 
least one commodity for which their share in world exports exceeds 10 percent. Again, our findings in Tables 2 and 3 were 
generally robust to the exclusion of these 34 countries. The only result that did not survive was the interaction effect of the 
commodity export price index and the non-agricultural commodity export price index with good governance in Table 3. This was 
due to the fact that only 10 of the 22 good governance countries remained in the sample. 
19
 Any time invariant omitted variables are captured by the fixed effects in our estimations. 
20
 These estimates were earlier used by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) to proxy resource abundance.  
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not enter the specifications by itself but only as a weight of the non-agricultural export 
price index. We therefore construct an instrument for the index by repeating the 
procedure in section 2.1 but instead of weighting the (unweighted) non-agricultural 
index by the ratio of non-agricultural commodity exports over GDP (assumed to be 
endogenous), we now weight it by the 2000 value of sub-soil assets in current US 
dollars per capita. For this instrument to be valid, it should be correlated with the ratio 
of non-agricultural exports over GDP, and it should not be correlated with the error 
term. The former is likely to hold, as commodity exports (net of imports) are only 
possible if those commodities are available in a country. The latter requires that the 
instrument does not itself affect growth, other than through its effect on the 
endogenous regressor (exclusion restriction), does not depend on growth, and is not 
correlated with omitted growth determinants. The former is likely to be fulfilled as it 
is hard to see how a country’s resource abundance could affect its exposure to 
commodity export prices, other than through its relationship with the level of 
commodity exports. The latter two requirements are less likely to be fulfilled. Slow-
growing countries are less likely to invest in geological exploration and are more 
likely to overexploit the discovered stock of resources. As a result, their stock of 
discovered resources in the ground may be lower than in fast-growing countries, 
everything else equal. This means that weighting the non-agricultural export price 
index by the value of sub-soil assets per capita may imply giving higher weights to 
fast-growing countries. Although this could potentially bias the results, the direction 
of the bias is opposite to the bias in the uninstrumented regressions, where higher 
weights were given to slow-growing countries. Comparing the coefficients of the 
instrumented and uninstrumented regressions can therefore shed light on the size of 
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the potential bias and the numerical range within which the actual coefficient is likely 
to be located.  
In addition to the export price indices, the dummy for good governance also 
potentially suffers from endogeneity, which could lead to a biased coefficient of the 
interaction term. The best instrument for governance is probably the settler mortality 
rate used by Acemoglu et al. (2001), but it is only available for 4 out of the 22 good 
governance countries in our sample. We therefore use three alternative variables, 
taken from Hall and Jones (1999): the fraction of the population speaking English, the 
fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe 
(English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish), and a country’s distance from the 
equator, measured as the absolute value of latitude in degrees divided by 90 to place it 
on a 0 to 1 scale. We construct an instrument for the interaction term of the index with 
the good governance dummy by running a probit regression of the governance 
dummy on the three variables from Hall and Jones (1999) for the sample in Table 3 
and collecting the fitted values.21 We interact the fitted values of the probit regression 
with the instrument for the non-agricultural commodity export price index discussed 
above.22 This yields an additional instrument for the interaction term of the non-
agricultural commodity export price index and the good governance dummy.  
We next use our constructed instruments to perform a two-stage-least-squares 
estimation procedure. For comparison, Table 5, columns (1) and (3), first report the 
OLS estimation results when replacing the commodity export price index in Table 3, 
columns (1) and (3), by the non-agricultural commodity export price index. The short 
and long run effects of non-agricultural commodity prices are consistent with the 
results for the composite index in Table 3. Table 5, columns (2) and (4), report the 
                                               
21
 All three variables enter with the expected positive signs and are significant at 1 percent. The pseudo R-squared is 0.69. 
22
 Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) perform a similar procedure to construct instruments, following Wooldridge (2002), p. 237. 
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two-stage-least-squares estimates, in which we instrument for the level and 
differences of the non-agricultural index (using the level and differences of the first 
constructed instrument), and for the interaction of the index with good governance 
(using the second constructed instrument).23  
The non-agricultural commodity export price index enters with a negative sign and 
is significant at 1 and 5 percent in columns (2) and (4), respectively. The size of the 
coefficients is very similar to the size of the coefficients in columns (1) and (3), 
indicating that if there is an endogeneity bias, it is likely to be small. In fact, we 
performed Davidson-MacKinnon tests of exogeneity and could not reject the null 
hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates for the non-agricultural commodity export 
price index in columns (2) and (4) with p-values of 0.48 and 0.33, respectively. Given 
that any potential biases in the OLS and 2SLS estimates are likely to have opposite 
signs, the failure to reject exogeneity implies that such biases are at most marginal.  
The coefficients of the interaction of the index with the good governance dummy are 
also similar to the coefficients in columns (1) and (3), although no longer significant. 
Again, Davidson-MacKinnon tests did not reject the null of exogeneity of the 
interaction terms with p-values of 0.44 and 0.46, respectively. The short-run 
coefficients of the non-agricultural index in Table 5, columns (2) and (4), enter with 
positive signs and gain in both size and significance compared to the OLS estimates in 
columns (1) and (3). We performed Davidson-MacKinnon tests for all three short-run 
coefficients in columns (2) and (4) and could not reject the null of consistent OLS 
estimates for 5 out of the 6 coefficients, while rejecting exogeneity at 10 percent for 
the second lag of the differenced non-agricultural index in column (4).24 This 
evidence suggests that any bias is likely to be small and if anything leads to a small 
                                               
23
 To save space, we do not report the results of the first stage. However, in all first-stage regressions, the relevant instrument 
enters with the expected sign and is statistically significant at 1 percent. The first-stage results are available upon request. 
24
 The p-values were 0.87, 0.47, 0.18, and 0.81, 0.15, 0.08 for the short-run coefficients in columns (2) and (4), respectively. 
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underestimation of the positive short-run growth effect of higher non-agricultural 
commodity export prices.  
These results indicate that the OLS estimates of the short- and long-run effects of 
non-agricultural commodity export prices are consistent. We next use the OLS 
specification in Table 5, column (3), to test the channels of the resource curse.  
 
6. The channels of the resource curse 
The literature offers seven candidate explanations for the resource curse effect: Dutch 
disease, governance, conflict, excessive borrowing, inequality, volatility, and lack of 
education. Since the responses appropriate for overcoming the resource curse differ 
radically as between these routes, their relative magnitude is evidently of importance. 
In this section we test for the importance of these explanations.  
We first explore the possibility that the long-run negative effect reflects the 
occurrence of Dutch Disease effects. An increase in commodity prices appreciates the 
real exchange rate, lowering the competitiveness of the non-resource exports sector, 
and potentially harming long-run output if there are positive externalities to 
production in this sector (Corden and Neary, 1982; Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Sachs and 
Warner, 1995a, 1999; Torvik, 2001). This argument is related to recent literature that 
shows how specialization in natural resources can divert economies away from 
manufacturing or other skill-intensive activities, thereby slowing down learning-by-
doing and reducing incentives for people to educate themselves (Michaels, 2006).  To 
test for the importance of this channel, we add a real exchange rate indicator25 to the 
specification in Table 5, column (3). As an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
                                               
25
 The best available indicator for the real appreciation of a country’s currency is probably a real effective exchange rate 
measure. Such measures are available but their coverage for the countries and years in our sample is limited. We therefore use 
the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar by adjusting the nominal exchange rate for relative consumer price levels 
(International Financial Statistics lines rf and 64). However, we experiment with a real effective exchange rate in section 6.1 
when we discuss the routes through which governance drives the resource curse. 
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could potentially affect GDP both in the short and in the long run, we include both the 
level and the first difference of the index. Further, to allow for the possibility that the 
effect of a real appreciation is different for resource-abundant countries, we also 
include interaction terms of the level and differenced exchange rate indicator with the 
share of non-agricultural exports in GDP. If the negative long-run effect of non-
agricultural commodity export prices works (partly) through their impact on the real 
exchange rate, then the estimated direct effect of the export price indices should 
become smaller once we control for exchange rate appreciation. The results are 
reported in the two columns in the top left corner of Table 6. In the first column, the 
level of the real exchange rate enters positive, suggesting that, consistent with Dutch 
disease, a more appreciated exchange rate (lower level of the indicator) is associated 
with lower long-run levels of GDP. The interaction of the index with the share of 
exports in GDP also enters positive, suggesting that this relationship is stronger in 
resource-abundant countries. However, both coefficients are not statistically 
significant and should therefore be viewed with caution. The differenced exchange 
rate variables are also insignificant. Adding the real exchange rate scarcely changes 
the coefficient of the non-agricultural export price index, as can be seen from the 
results in the second column for the same sample without the real exchange rate. The 
long-run coefficient changes from -1.29 to -1.25, which suggests that Dutch Disease 
does not explain the long-run resource curse effect. Although countries with good 
governance do not suffer from a resource curse, their long-term gain from higher 
commodity prices might be negatively affected by Dutch Disease.26 This gain is 
captured by the linear combination of the coefficients of the non-agricultural index 
and its interaction with good governance. This combination changes from 1.00 for the 
                                               
26
 The term “Dutch Disease” originated in the Netherlands, a “good governance” country with the highest mean composite ICRG 
rating after Switzerland and Norway. During the 1960s, the high revenue generated by its natural gas discovery led to a sharp 
decline in the competitiveness of its other, non-booming tradable sector. 
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specification without the real exchange rate to 1.05 for the specification with the real 
exchange rate, indicating that Dutch Disease is not important in understanding the 
effect of higher commodity prices on GDP in good governance countries.  
We next explore whether the resource curse induces weak governance. The 
literature has proposed several such routes. Resource rents may invite non-productive 
lobbying and rent seeking, as in Tornell and Lane (1999), Baland and Francois 
(2000), Torvik (2002), and Wick and Bulte (2006). Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that 
this problem only occurs in countries with grabber-friendly institutions, while 
countries with producer-friendly institutions do not suffer from a curse. A related 
literature emphasizes the role of government in the misallocation of resource 
revenues. Robinson et al. (2006) argue that resource booms have adverse effects 
because they provide incentives for politicians to engage in inefficient redistribution 
in return for political support. Again, existing institutions are crucial, as they 
determine the extent to which politicians can respond to these perverse incentives. 
The inefficient redistribution can take various forms such as public employment 
provision (Robinson et al., 2006), subsidies to farmers, labor market regulation, and 
protection of domestic industries from international competition (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2001). We investigate governance using the same approach as for Dutch 
disease. There is no agreed composite measure of the quality of governance and so we 
have investigated a range of commonly used proxies: the Composite International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) risk rating (PRS Group), the parallel market exchange 
rate premium (Global Development Network Growth Database), civil liberties and 
political rights (Freedom House), political constraints (Henisz, 2002), democracy, 
autocracy, and a combined measure of democracy and autocracy (Polity IV), and 
checks and balances (Database of Political Institutions 2004). To save space, the third 
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and fourth column of the top left corner of Table 6 (“Governance”) only report the 
results for the composite ICRG risk rating27 since adding any of these other indicators 
scarcely changes the long run results. The effect of the ICRG rating is positive and 
significant at 1 percent, both in the short and in the long run, indicating that good 
governance countries grow faster. For resource-abundant countries, the long-run 
effect is bigger, although the difference is not significant. While these results indicate 
that the quality of governance is an important GDP determinant, it only leads to a 
marginally smaller resource curse effect. The long-run coefficient of commodity 
prices changes from -1.43 to -1.39, suggesting that the deterioration of governance is 
not the central explanation of the resource curse. So even though the resource curse 
only occurs in countries with weak governance, it is not explained by a deterioration 
of governance in those countries.  
We next turn more briefly to five other proposed channels for the resource curse. 
First, resource abundance can increase the incidence of violence (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). This can occur through a weakening of the state, easy finance for 
rebels and warlords (Skaperdas, 2002), or quasi-criminal activities and gang rivalries 
(Mehlum et al., 2006; Hodler, 2006). Secondly, resource abundance can tempt a 
government into excessive external borrowing, as in Mansoorian (1991) and Manzano 
and Rigobon (2006). Thirdly, resource abundance exposes countries to commodity 
price volatility which could discourage investment (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2003). Fourthly, resource abundance can lead to increased inequality, which can harm 
growth (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). And finally, as suggested by Gylfason 
(2001), resource abundance can lower incentives for citizens or the government to 
invest in education, which can also lower growth. We investigate the importance of 
                                               
27
 The ICRG rating is only available since 1984, but the coverage is better for 1985. We therefore use the 1985 ratings for all 
years in our sample prior to 1986, which means we do not capture changes in governance for these years. However, the results 
for governance are robust to using alternative indicators that are available for all years in our sample. 
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these channels through the same approach.28 Controlling for these possible channels 
does not lead to smaller coefficients for our export price index, suggesting that 
individually these channels do not explain our resource curse finding.29 
 
6.1 Testing the routes through which governance drives the resource curse 
Even though the resource curse does not work through governance, we have found 
strong evidence that it works conditional on governance. The recent theoretical 
literature proposes two explanations, each of which implies additional channels of the 
resource curse. Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that resource rents invite non-productive 
lobbying and rent seeking, and that the pay-off from these activities is high in 
countries with grabber-friendly institutions but low in countries with producer-
friendly institutions. This leads entrepreneurs in countries with bad institutions away 
from productive activities into non-productive rent-seeking activities, which in the 
long run slows down industrial development. We empirically test this theory by 
adding measures of the importance of the manufacturing and services sectors to our 
specification.30 The results are reported in the top right and bottom left corners of 
Table 6. Controlling for manufacturing and services only leads to marginally smaller 
coefficients for our export price index. We can therefore conclude that the resource 
curse does not seem to work through a slower speed of industrial development or 
lower growth in the services sector. 
                                               
28
 We use the following indicators for conflict, excessive borrowing, inequality, and volatility, respectively: the cumulative 
number of civil war years; total external debt to GNP (World Bank’s Global Development Finance); gross household income 
inequality (gini), from the University of Texas Inequality Project (EHII2.3); a variable that captures the pre-1986 mean absolute 
change in the general unweighted commodity export price index for the years before 1986 and the post-1985 mean absolute 
change in the general unweighted commodity export price index for the years after 1985. For education we use three variables:  
the average years of primary, the average years of secondary, and the average years of higher schooling of the population aged 15 
and over (Barro and Lee, 2000). Since these variables are only available for 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 
and 1999, we fill in the missing years by linear interpolation.  
29
 The coefficient of the interaction term of the index with good governance is insignificant for the specifications under 
“Excessive borrowing” in Table 6. This is due to a very low availability of the external debt variable for good governance 
countries. The same holds for the specifications under “Manufacturing”, discussed in section 6.1. To save space, Table 6 does not 
report the results for education.  
30
 Manufacturing and services as a share of GDP were both taken from the World Development Indicators. 
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The other recently proposed explanation points at inefficient redistribution by the 
government. Robinson et al. (2006) argue that permanent commodity booms increase 
incentives for politicians to stay in power. In countries where government 
accountability is lacking, politicians will use the resource windfall revenues to bias 
the outcome of elections or in non-democratic regimes political contests. This bias 
can be induced in many ways but Robinson et al. refer to informal literature that 
“points to the centrality of public sector employment as a tool for influencing people’s 
voting behaviour”. Hence, resource rents create inefficiencies by facilitating public 
employment provision by politicians in return for political support, but only in 
countries with weak institutions. In countries with strong institutions, the extent to 
which politicians can use public money to bias elections is limited and therefore the 
resource curse does not occur. In addition to public employment provision, inefficient 
redistribution can take place through protection of domestic industries from 
international competition, subsidies to farmers, and labor market regulation 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). We empirically test this theory by adding measures 
of public consumption and de jure and de facto trade openness to our specification.31 
The results for openness are reported in the third to sixth column of the bottom part of 
Table 6, while the results for public consumption are reported in the next two 
columns. Controlling for either de jure or de facto openness hardly changes the long-
run effect of the index, but the negative effect of public consumption seems to explain 
part of the resource curse. The absolute size of the coefficient falls by 22 percent. 
These results support the argument of Robinson et al. (2006) that commodity booms 
                                               
31
 For public consumption we use general government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP, which includes civil 
servant salaries (World Development Indicators). For de jure trade openness we use a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a 
country has open trade, constructed by Sachs and Warner (1995b). For de facto openness we use the (logged) index of real 
exchange rate overvaluation from the Global Development Network Growth Database. The index captures the extent to which 
the real exchange rate is distorted away from a hypothetical free-trade level. 
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lead to inefficient public sector employment provision which then slows down 
economic development. 
In both explanations of why governance is important, booms lead workers or 
entrepreneurs away from productive activities into less productive rent-seeking or 
public sector activities. With this shift, one might expect to see a shift in the pattern of 
a country’s aggregate expenditures as well. As more people secure their income 
through rent-seeking or public employment and the government allocates more of its 
revenue to public employment provision, aggregate investment levels will fall and 
public and private consumption will increase. Gylfason and Zoega (2006) show 
empirically that natural resource dependence slows down growth through lower levels 
of investment.  
In addition to lowering investment, booms may also lead to a lower quality of 
investment projects. Robinson and Torvik (2005) develop a theory in which “white 
elephants”, investment projects with negative social surplus, are used as a means of 
inefficient redistribution aimed at influencing the outcomes of elections. This suggests 
yet another channel of the curse: inefficient redistribution through inefficient 
investment projects. We test the importance of these shifts in expenditure by adding 
measures of private consumption and total investment to our specification.32 The 
results are reported in the ninth to twelfth column of the bottom part of Table 6. 
Controlling for private consumption and total investment takes away part of the long-
run resource curse effect. The absolute size of the coefficient falls by 17 percent and 
14 percent, respectively. Also note that the positive long-run effect of investment is 
significantly smaller in resource-rich economies. This is consistent with the theory of 
                                               
32
 The World Development Indicators database does distinguish between public and private consumption but does not distinguish 
between public and private investment. As a measure of private consumption we use household final consumption expenditure as 
a share of GDP. For total investment we use gross capital formation as a share of GDP.  
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inefficient redistribution through inefficient investment projects in Robinson and 
Torvik (2005). 
In addition to these political economy explanations of why the resource curse works 
conditional on poor governance, Matsen and Torvik (2005) show that resource-rich 
countries with high savings rates generally have managed to escape the curse, while 
countries with low savings rates have not. This suggests that the curse may work 
through Dutch disease, but only in countries that spend a relatively large part of the 
windfall. Since bad governance countries tend to be big spenders, this could explain 
our findings. To test the importance of this channel, we once more add a real 
exchange rate indicator to our baseline specification. The best available indicators for 
the real appreciation of a country’s currency are probably real effective exchange rate 
measures but their data coverage is limited. Since we now want to investigate the 
importance of Dutch disease in bad governance countries, we restrict our sample to 
such countries and add the real effective exchange rate measure with the largest 
coverage, the (logged) IMF’s real effective exchange rate index based on relative 
consumer prices (IFS line “rec”), to our baseline specification. The results are 
reported in the last two columns of the bottom part of Table 6. The long-run 
coefficient of the real effective exchange rate is positive and significant at 5 percent. 
This suggests that real exchange rate appreciations are associated with higher long-
run growth rates. This does probably not imply that causality runs from exchange rate 
appreciation to GDP, but rather in the opposite way or through an omitted variable. 
The long-run coefficient is significantly different for resource-abundant countries, as 
the interaction term enters negative and is significant at 5 percent. This indicates that 
for countries with non-agricultural exports to GDP levels above 7 percent, the long-
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run effect of a real appreciation on GDP is negative, consistent with Dutch disease. 
The short-run effects are not significant.  
The low coverage of the real exchange rate indicator lowers the sample size to a 
level where, in the absence of the exchange rate indicator, the resource curse effect is 
just insignificant (p-value is 0.101). However, the size of the coefficient (-1.86) is 
comparable to the coefficients in the larger samples. If anything, the resource curse 
effect is bigger in the smaller sample than in the larger ones. This gives us some 
confidence that the smaller sample can be used to test the importance of Dutch 
disease. Adding the real effective exchange rate index changes the coefficient of the 
non-agricultural export price index from -1.86 to -0.52, suggesting that Dutch disease 
does indeed explain an important part of the long-run resource curse effect.33  
We next investigate whether combinations of indicators can explain the resource 
curse effect in our estimations. We start with the variables that are individually 
important in explaining the curse: the real effective exchange rate, public 
consumption, private consumption, and total investment. We include these variables 
in our baseline specification and again test their importance by eliminating each of 
them individually and observing the change in the long-run coefficient, while keeping 
the sample constant. We find that, once we control for the other variables, the real 
effective exchange rate, public consumption, and private consumption remain 
important, while total investment does not. Hence, we rerun the specifications with 
the real effective exchange rate, public consumption, and private consumption only. 
The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 7. The three variables 
together fully explain the resource curse effect, which is now significant again. The 
                                               
33
 We also ran fixed effects panel regressions of the change in the logged real effective exchange rate index on the change in the 
non-agricultural export price index. The contemporaneous as well as the first three lags of the change in the export price index 
entered positive and statistically significant, supporting the Dutch disease hypothesis that commodity booms lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
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long-run coefficient changes from -1.96 to +0.78. Hence, once we control for the real 
effective exchange rate, public consumption, and private consumption as channels of 
the resource curse, higher commodity prices no longer have a negative long-run 
effect. If anything, they are a blessing rather than a curse, just as in good governance 
countries.  
As a robustness check we again considered all of the other channels by adding each 
of the indicators individually to the specification in Table 7, column (1), and 
observing the long-run coefficient, while again keeping the sample constant. The 
results support our earlier finding that these other channels cannot account for the 
curse: controlling for them does not lead to smaller coefficients for our export price 
index. The only three exceptions are external debt, manufacturing, and services. If we 
control for each of these three additional variables, the size of the positive long-run 
effect of commodity prices increases. Table 7, columns (3) and (4), report the results 
when we add these three variables to the specifications of columns (1) and (2). 
Controlling for the total of six variables changes the long-run resource curse 
coefficient from -2.60 to +1.10. We conclude that the resource curse can be explained 
by real exchange rate appreciation, public and private consumption, and to a lesser 
extent external debt, manufacturing, and services.  
 
7. Conclusions 
We find strong evidence of a resource curse. Commodity booms have positive short-
term effects on output, but adverse long-term effects. The long-term effects are 
confined to “high-rent”, non-agricultural commodities. Within this group, we find that 
the resource curse is avoided by countries with sufficiently good institutions. We 
investigate possible transmission channels and find that real exchange rate 
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appreciation, public and private consumption, and to a lesser extent external debt, 
manufacturing, and services, explain the resource curse. This lends support to the 
large literature that stresses the importance of Dutch disease in resource-rich 
economies. It also supports recent theory that points at inefficient redistribution in 
return for political support as the root of the curse.  
Our findings have important implications for non-agricultural commodity exporters 
with weak institutions, many of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using our 
estimation results, we simulated the effects of the post-2000 boom in global 
commodity prices on the growth rate of Africa’s commodity exporting economies. 
We find that half of the current growth of these economies is attributable to short-term 
effects of the commodity boom, leaving a residual of underlying growth that remains 
low. Moreover, the current boom is, if past behaviour is repeated, likely to have 
strongly adverse long term effects, so that the recent acceleration in growth rates is 
particularly misleading. However, if our tentative diagnosis of the root cause of the 
resource curse as being due to errors in governance is correct, then this prognosis 
could be avoided by improvements in the quality of governance.  
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Table 1a Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Real GDP per capita (log) 3608 7.54 1.55 4.31 10.55 
Trade to GDP 3608 0.64 0.36 0.06 2.51 
Inflation (log (1 + inflation rate))  3608 0.14 0.29 -0.24 5.48 
Reserves to GDP 3608 0.09 0.10 0.00 1.24 
Commodity export price index 3608 0.34 0.36 0.00 1.97 
Unlogged unweighted index (1980 = 100) 3608 81.07 26.87 15.10 230.05 
Commodity exports to GDP 3608 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.45 
Non-agricultural commodity export price index 3608 0.18 0.33 0.00 1.84 
Unlogged unweighted non-agri index (1980 = 100) 3608 83.01 27.04 14.92 260.58 
Non-agricultural commodity exports to GDP 3608 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.40 
Agricultural commodity export price index 3608 0.16 0.21 0.00 1.11 
Unlogged unweighted agri index (1980 = 100) 3608 92.02 28.54 30.57 337.32 
Agricultural commodity exports to GDP 3608 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.24 
Dummy good governance 3087 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Oil import price index 3608 3.11 1.85 0.00 4.96 
∆ GDP per capita (log)
 
3608 0.02 0.05 -0.36 0.30 
∆ Trade to GDP 3608 0.01 0.08 -0.88 1.21 
∆ Inflation (log (1 + inflation rate)) 3608 -0.00 0.19 -3.62 2.52 
∆ Reserves to GDP 3608 0.00 0.03 -0.25 0.31 
∆ Commodity export price index 3608 0.00 0.02 -0.27 0.41 
∆ Unlogged unweighted index (1980 = 100) 3608 -0.51 13.24 -77.88 73.09 
∆ Oil import price index 3608 0.02 0.21 -0.68 0.93 
Coup
 
 3608 0.03 0.17 0 2 
Civil war 3608 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Natural disaster 3608 0.25 0.58 0 4 
 
 
Table 1b Commodities 
Non-agricultural 
Aluminum Gasoline Natural gas Phosphatrock Uranium 
Coal Ironore Nickel Silver Urea 
Copper Lead Oil Tin Zinc 
Agricultural 
Bananas Cotton Oliveoil Pulp Sugar 
Barley Fish Oranges Rice Sunfloweroil 
Butter Groundnutoil Palmkerneloil Rubber Swinemeat 
Cocoabeans Groundnuts Palmoil Sisal Tea 
Coconutoil Hides Pepper Sorghum Tobacco 
Coffee Jute Plywood Soybeanoil Wheat 
Copra Maize Poultry Soybeans Wool 
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Table 2 Estimation results: baseline specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimates of long-run coefficients 
Trade to GDP 
 
0.851*** 
(0.177) 
0.927*** 
(0.188) 
0.466*** 
(0.131) 
0.483*** 
(0.128) 
Inflation (log) 
 
-0.215* 
(0.121) 
-0.216* 
(0.121) 
-0.185** 
(0.077) 
-0.188** 
(0.077) 
Reserves to GDP 
 
0.869** 
(0.375) 
0.928** 
(0.388) 
0.665*** 
(0.253) 
0.642** 
(0.253) 
Commodity export price index 
 
-1.947*** 
(0.416)  
-1.243*** 
(0.346)  
Non-agricultural export price index 
 
 
-2.214*** 
(0.387)  
-1.395*** 
(0.352) 
Agricultural export price index 
 
 
1.589 
(1.971)  
0.920 
(1.198) 
Oil import price index 
 
-0.164*** 
(0.057) 
-0.178*** 
(0.060) 
-0.139 
(0.086) 
-0.157* 
(0.089) 
 Estimates of short-run coefficients 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.062*** 
(0.008) 
-0.063*** 
(0.008) 
∆ GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
0.150*** 
(0.031) 
0.147*** 
(0.031) 
0.136*** 
(0.029) 
0.135*** 
(0.029) 
∆ Trade to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
∆ Inflation (log)
 t-1 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
∆ Reserves to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.091*** 
(0.032) 
0.090*** 
(0.032) 
0.045 
(0.035) 
0.045 
(0.035) 
∆ Commodity export price index
 t 
 
0.085 
(0.059) 
0.085 
(0.058) 
0.043 
(0.063) 
0.046 
(0.063) 
∆ Commodity export price index
 t-1 
 
0.146** 
(0.061) 
0.141** 
(0.061) 
0.202*** 
(0.070) 
0.197*** 
(0.069) 
∆ Commodity export price index
 t-2 
 
0.073 
(0.050) 
0.068 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.059) 
0.061 
(0.059) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-1 
 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-2 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
Coup
 t 
 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.007) 
-0.031*** 
(0.007) 
Civil war
 t 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
Natural disaster
 t 
 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regional time dummies NO NO YES YES 
Observations 3608 3608 3608 3608 
R-squared within 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.26 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1a The long-run effect of commodity export prices on gdp per capita 
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Notes: Figure 1a is based on the estimation results in Table 2, column (3). The solid line denotes the elasticity of gdp per capita 
with respect to commodity export prices. The dashed lines illustrate the 95% confidence interval. The range of values on the 
horizontal axis corresponds to the range of values in the estimation sample. 
 
Figure 1b The short-run effect of commodity export prices on gdp per capita 
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Notes: Figure 1b is based on the estimation results in Table 2, column (3). The four lines denote the impulse response functions 
of an increase in the growth rate of commodity export prices in period t for different levels of commodity exports to GDP. A 
value of 0.03 on the vertical axis implies that a 10 percentage point increase in the growth rate of commodity export prices leads 
to a 0.30 percentage point increase in the gdp per capita growth rate. 
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Table 3 Estimation results: the resource curse conditional on governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimates of long-run coefficients 
Trade to GDP 
 
0.922*** 
(0.198) 
1.002*** 
(0.206) 
0.469*** 
(0.142) 
0.502*** 
(0.145) 
Inflation (log) 
 
-0.215* 
(0.123) 
-0.210* 
(0.121) 
-0.185** 
(0.076) 
-0.188** 
(0.077) 
Reserves to GDP 
 
0.767* 
(0.403) 
0.818* 
(0.424) 
0.571** 
(0.277) 
0.548* 
(0.282) 
Commodity export price index 
 
-2.051*** 
(0.426)  
-1.261*** 
(0.342)  
Commodity export price index * good governance 
 
1.757 
(1.510)  
1.689*** 
(0.635)  
Non-agricultural export price index 
 
 
-2.261*** 
(0.398)  
-1.369*** 
(0.351) 
Non-agricultural export price index * good governance 
 
 
3.467*** 
(0.586)  
2.124*** 
(0.603) 
Agricultural export price index 
 
 
1.988 
(2.102)  
1.130 
(1.225) 
Agricultural export price index * good governance 
 
 
-9.003 
(6.273)  
-0.132 
(3.475) 
Oil import price index 
 
-0.170*** 
(0.065) 
-0.177*** 
(0.065) 
-0.127 
(0.084) 
-0.136 
(0.087) 
 Estimates of short-run coefficients 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
-0.039*** 
(0.005) 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
-0.065*** 
(0.009) 
-0.065*** 
(0.009) 
∆ GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
0.165*** 
(0.034) 
0.162*** 
(0.034) 
0.155*** 
(0.031) 
0.154*** 
(0.031) 
∆ Trade to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.004 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
∆ Inflation (log)
 t-1 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
∆ Reserves to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.107*** 
(0.039) 
0.105*** 
(0.039) 
0.054 
(0.043) 
0.054 
(0.043) 
∆ Commodity export price index
 t 
 
0.086 
(0.058) 
0.085 
(0.058) 
0.029 
(0.063) 
0.032 
(0.064) 
∆ Commodity export price index
 t-1 
 
0.145** 
(0.062) 
0.139** 
(0.062) 
0.203*** 
(0.072) 
0.199*** 
(0.072) 
∆ Commodity export price index
 t-2 
 
0.073 
(0.051) 
0.068 
(0.051) 
0.062 
(0.062) 
0.058 
(0.062) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t 
 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-1 
 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-2 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
Coup
 t 
 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.028*** 
(0.007) 
-0.028*** 
(0.007) 
Civil war
 t 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
Natural disaster
 t 
 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regional time dummies NO NO YES YES 
Observations 3087 3087 3087 3087 
R-squared within 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.29 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Estimation results: subsamples good and bad governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 bad gov. good gov. bad gov. good gov. 
 Estimates of long-run coefficients 
Trade to GDP 
 
0.680*** 
(0.159) 
1.724*** 
(0.435) 
0.390*** 
(0.128) 
2.018** 
(0.843) 
Inflation (log) 
 
-0.164 
(0.109) 
-2.023*** 
(0.648) 
-0.173** 
(0.075) 
-2.102* 
(1.067) 
Reserves to GDP 
 
1.225** 
(0.537) 
0.343 
(0.221) 
0.585 
(0.446) 
0.976 
(0.856) 
Non-agricultural export price index 
 
-1.779*** 
(0.351) 
1.663** 
(0.603) 
-1.314*** 
(0.386) 
1.465 
(1.038) 
Oil import price index 
 
-0.133** 
(0.061) 
-0.296** 
(0.111) 
-0.158 
(0.112) 
-0.344** 
(0.154) 
 Estimates of short-run coefficients 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
-0.048*** 
(0.008) 
-0.031*** 
(0.005) 
-0.072*** 
(0.011) 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
∆ GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
0.161*** 
(0.036) 
0.246*** 
(0.032) 
0.147*** 
(0.034) 
0.220*** 
(0.030) 
∆ Trade to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.005 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
0.065** 
(0.024) 
∆ Inflation (log)
 t-1 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.077 
(0.053) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.053 
(0.044) 
∆ Reserves to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.097** 
(0.047) 
0.092* 
(0.053) 
0.052 
(0.052) 
0.121** 
(0.050) 
∆ Non-agricultural export price index
 t 
 
0.071 
(0.066) 
0.199** 
(0.087) 
0.009 
(0.077) 
0.133 
(0.082) 
∆ Non-agricultural export price index
 t-1  
 
0.115* 
(0.069) 
0.061 
(0.054) 
0.165** 
(0.080) 
0.135** 
(0.055) 
∆ Non-agricultural export price index
 t-2  
 
0.059 
(0.056) 
-0.006 
(0.047) 
0.050 
(0.072) 
0.002 
(0.053) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t 
 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-1 
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-2 
 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Coup
 t 
 
-0.029*** 
(0.009) 
-0.059*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
-0.051*** 
(0.006) 
Civil war
 t 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Natural disaster
 t 
 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regional time dummies NO NO YES YES 
Observations 2290 797 2290 797 
R-squared within 0.14 0.34 0.28 0.57 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are clustered by country and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Estimation results: instrumental variables estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimates of long-run coefficients 
Trade to GDP 
 
0.978*** 
(0.198) 
1.131*** 
(0.153) 
0.492*** 
(0.142) 
0.634*** 
(0.112) 
Inflation (log) 
 
-0.215* 
(0.121) 
-0.093 
(0.088) 
-0.186** 
(0.076) 
-0.133** 
(0.057) 
Reserves to GDP 
 
0.806** 
(0.405) 
0.966*** 
(0.350) 
0.557** 
(0.276) 
0.711*** 
(0.234) 
Non-agricultural export price index 
 
-2.236*** 
(0.406) 
-2.013*** 
(0.629) 
-1.294*** 
(0.349) 
-1.420** 
(0.635) 
Non-agricultural export price index * good governance 
 
3.365*** 
(0.664) 
3.077 
(2.128) 
2.117*** 
(0.606) 
2.017 
(1.359) 
Oil import price index 
 
-0.182*** 
(0.065) 
-0.218*** 
(0.064) 
-0.132 
(0.087) 
-0.183* 
(0.105) 
 Estimates of short-run coefficients 
GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
-0.039*** 
(0.005) 
-0.041*** 
(0.004) 
-0.065*** 
(0.009) 
-0.066*** 
(0.006) 
∆ GDP per capita (log)t-1 
 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
0.141*** 
(0.020) 
0.157*** 
(0.031) 
0.140*** 
(0.021) 
∆ Trade to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.003 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
∆ Inflation (log)
 t-1 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
∆ Reserves to GDP
 t-1 
 
0.109*** 
(0.039) 
0.131*** 
(0.031) 
0.059 
(0.043) 
0.068** 
(0.033) 
∆ Non-agricultural export price index
 t 
 
0.073 
(0.063) 
0.130** 
(0.051) 
0.030 
(0.071) 
0.143 
(0.103) 
∆ Non-agricultural export price index
 t-1  
 
0.115* 
(0.068) 
0.170*** 
(0.052) 
0.158** 
(0.076) 
0.301*** 
(0.102) 
∆ Non-agricultural export price index
 t-2  
 
0.059 
(0.054) 
0.091* 
(0.050) 
0.046 
(0.067) 
0.249** 
(0.100) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t 
 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-1 
 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
∆ Oil import price index
 t-2 
 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
Coup
 t 
 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.028*** 
(0.007) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
Civil war
 t 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
Natural disaster
 t 
 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Regional time dummies NO NO YES YES 
Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Observations 3087 2634 3087 2634 
R-squared within 0.14 0.16 0.28 0.30 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita. Columns (1) and (3) report OLS estimation results.  
Columns (2) and (4) report the second-stage results of a two-stages-least-squares procedure in which we instrument for the lagged level, 
difference, and two lagged differences of the non-agricultural export price index, and for its interaction with the good governance dummy. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita. All regressions are based on the specification in Table 5, column (3), and include country-specific fixed effects and regional time dummies. 
We only report the coefficients and standard errors of the variables of interest. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See section 5 for an explanation of the indicators. 
Table 6 Testing the channels of the resource curse 
 Dutch disease Governance Conflict Excessive borrowing Inequality Volatility Manufacturing 
Indicator 
 
0.08 
(0.07)  
1.23*** 
(0.44)  
0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.18** 
(0.08)  
-0.72 
(1.01)  
0.93 
(1.43)  
1.34 
(0.95)  
Indicator  
* Non-agri exports/GDP 
0.64 
(0.41)  
3.48 
(2.57)  
0.02 
(0.17)  
0.46 
(0.32)  
5.22 
(9.03)  
-0.99 
(6.28)  
-7.58* 
(3.98)  
∆ Indicator 
 
-0.01 
(0.01)  
0.27*** 
(0.06)  
-0.02*** 
(0.01)  
-0.07*** 
(0.02)  
-0.12 
(0.09)  
-0.27** 
(0.13)  
0.07 
(0.15)  
∆ Indicator  
* Non-agri exports/GDP 
0.08 
(0.07)  
-0.00 
(0.35)  
-0.06 
(0.04)  
0.17* 
(0.08)  
1.97** 
(0.87)  
0.37 
(0.87)  
-0.46 
(1.45)  
Non-agri export price index 
 
-1.25*** 
(0.38) 
-1.29*** 
(0.35) 
-1.39*** 
(0.34) 
-1.43*** 
(0.34) 
-1.36*** 
(0.37) 
-1.29*** 
(0.35) 
-1.66*** 
(0.47) 
-1.46*** 
(0.40) 
-1.14** 
(0.50) 
-0.99* 
(0.52) 
-1.30*** 
(0.36) 
-1.29*** 
(0.35) 
-1.41*** 
(0.36) 
-1.45*** 
(0.37) 
Non-agri export price index 
* good governance 
2.30*** 
(0.62) 
2.29*** 
(0.61) 
2.12*** 
(0.62) 
2.11*** 
(0.60) 
2.14*** 
(0.63) 
2.12*** 
(0.61) 
-0.72 
(4.72) 
1.14 
(4.36) 
1.64*** 
(0.60) 
1.69*** 
(0.61) 
2.14*** 
(0.61) 
2.12*** 
(0.61) 
0.65 
(0.61) 
0.81 
(0.62) 
Observations 
R-squared within 
2915 
0.29 
2915 
0.28 
2857 
0.32 
2857 
0.29 
3087 
0.28 
3087 
0.28 
1872 
0.32 
1872 
0.29 
1752 
0.37 
1752 
0.37 
3087 
0.28 
3087 
0.28 
2396 
0.31 
2396 
0.30 
 Services De jure openness De facto openness Public consumption Private consumption Total investment Dutch disease (2) 
Indicator 
 
0.05 
(0.50)  
0.00 
(0.08)  
-0.10 
(0.07)  
-0.60 
(0.74)  
-1.14*** 
(0.40)  
2.60*** 
(0.58)  
0.10** 
(0.05)  
Indicator  
* Non-agri exports/GDP 
2.55 
(2.60)  
0.95 
(0.70)  
-0.46 
(0.43)  
-5.08 
(6.75)  
6.23*** 
(2.17)  
-7.54*** 
(2.57)  
-1.44** 
(0.70)  
∆ Indicator 
 
-0.13 
(0.09)  
0.01 
(0.01)  
0.01 
(0.02)  
-0.22 
(0.15)  
-0.18*** 
(0.05)  
0.42*** 
(0.07)  
-0.00 
(0.02)  
∆ Indicator  
* Non-agri exports/GDP 
-0.19 
(0.56)  
0.11 
(0.07)  
-0.04 
(0.10)  
-1.14 
(0.84)  
-0.11 
(0.47)  
-0.16 
(0.73)  
-0.13 
(0.10)  
Non-agri export price index 
 
-1.30*** 
(0.37) 
-1.36*** 
(0.38) 
-0.71** 
(0.33) 
-0.72** 
(0.31) 
-1.11** 
(0.46) 
-1.25*** 
(0.42) 
-0.99** 
(0.43) 
-1.27*** 
(0.36) 
-1.15*** 
(0.38) 
-1.39*** 
(0.37) 
-1.18*** 
(0.35) 
-1.37*** 
(0.37) 
-0.52 
(1.28) 
-1.86 
(1.11) 
Non-agri export price index 
* good governance 
1.44** 
(0.71) 
1.32* 
(0.68) 
1.52*** 
(0.49) 
1.51*** 
(0.48) 
1.94*** 
(0.63) 
2.00*** 
(0.63) 
1.89*** 
(0.61) 
2.03*** 
(0.61) 
1.97*** 
(0.52) 
2.26*** 
(0.58) 
2.10*** 
(0.78)) 
2.34*** 
(0.58) 
- 
 
- 
 
Observations 
R-squared within 
2742 
0.29 
2742 
0.29 
1956 
0.35 
1956 
0.34 
2689 
0.31 
2689 
0.31 
3046 
0.30 
3046 
0.28 
2972 
0.30 
2972 
0.28 
2989 
0.35 
2989 
0.28 
856 
0.37 
856 
0.36 
Table 7 Testing the channels of the resource curse (continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimates of long-run coefficients 
Real effective exchange rate index 
 
0.11*** 
(0.03)  
0.09** 
(0.04)  
Real effective exchange rate index * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
-2.13*** 
(0.53)  
-1.59** 
(0.78)  
Public consumption 
 
-1.23 
(0.89)  
-0.81 
(1.07)  
Public consumption * Non-agri exports/GDP  
 
-1.20 
(6.97)  
-8.69 
(8.17)  
Private consumption 
 
-1.35* 
(0.78)  
-1.13 
(0.88)  
Private consumption * Non-agri exports/GDP  
 
9.51** 
(4.02)  
4.51 
(3.79)  
External debt 
 
  
-0.05 
(0.11)  
External debt * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
  
0.67 
(0.71)  
Manufacturing 
 
  
2.39* 
(1.22)  
Manufacturing * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
  
-5.15 
(7.14)  
Services 
 
  
0.59 
(0.75)  
Services * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
  
-1.60 
(3.99)  
Non-agricultural export price index 
 
0.78 
(0.97) 
-1.96* 
(1.13) 
1.10 
(0.89) 
-2.60* 
(1.30) 
 Estimates of short-run coefficients 
∆ Real effective exchange rate index 
 
-0.00 
(0.02)  
-0.03** 
(0.01)  
∆ Real effective exchange rate index * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
-0.11 
(0.11)  
-0.08 
(0.09)  
∆ Public consumption 
 
-0.22 
(0.15)  
-0.14 
(0.14)  
∆ Public consumption * Non-agri exports/GDP  
 
-0.37 
(0.84)  
-1.12 
(0.94)  
∆ Private consumption 
 
-0.21*** 
(0.05)  
-0.17*** 
(0.05)  
∆ Private consumption * Non-agri exports/GDP  
 
0.51 
(0.44)  
0.06 
(0.37)  
∆ External debt 
 
  
-0.05** 
(0.02)  
∆ External debt * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
  
0.03 
(0.09)  
∆ Manufacturing 
 
  
0.09 
(0.26)  
∆ Manufacturing * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
  
0.29 
(1.21)  
∆ Services 
 
  
-0.04 
(0.11)  
∆ Services * Non-agri exports/GDP 
 
  
0.96* 
(0.56)  
Observations 
R-squared within 
849 
0.40 
849 
0.36 
708 
0.49 
708 
0.42 
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-differenced log of real GDP per capita. All regressions are based on the specification in 
Table 5, column (3), and include country-specific fixed effects and regional time dummies. We only report the coefficients and 
standard errors of the variables of interest. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Appendix A Data description and sources 
Real GDP per capita  in constant 2000 US $ (World Development Indicators (WDI)) 
Commodity export price index Commodity export values for 1990 from UNCTAD 
Commodity Yearbook 2000 and UN International Trade Statistics 1993 and 1994. 
Quarterly world commodity price indices from International Financial Statistics (IFS, 
series 74 for butter and coal, 76 for all others), except for the natural gas and gasoline 
indices, which are from the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual 
Energy Review 2005 (Column (1) in Tables 5.24 and 6.7). Four price series (coal, 
plywood, silver, and sorghum) had short gaps in the early periods. Following Dehn 
(2000), we filled these gaps by holding the price constant at the value of the first 
available observation. Four price series (palmkerneloil, bananas, tobacco, and silver) 
had 1, 2, or 3 missing values in the middle. These gaps were filled by linear 
interpolation. Price series with larger gaps were not adjusted. Where gaps for 
relatively unimportant commodities (share of exports in total exports < 10% or share 
of exports in GDP < 1%) would cause missing observations, these price series were 
left out. The geometrically weighted index was first calculated on a quarterly basis 
and deflated by the export unit value (IFS, series 74..DZF). We then weighted the log 
of the annual average (rescaled so that 1980 = 100) index by the share of commodity 
exports in GDP (GDP in current US dollars, WDI). The sub-indices for non-
agricultural and agricultural commodities are constructed in the same way.34 The oil 
import price index was constructed by interacting the log of the annual average 
deflated oil price index with a dummy variable for net oil importers. Net oil imports 
are crude oil imports plus total imports of refined petroleum products minus crude oil 
exports minus total exports of refined petroleum products (EIA Annual Energy 
                                               
34
 To ensure that when replacing the general commodity export price index by the sub-indices the sample remains the same, we 
exclude commodities with incomplete time series. 
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Review 2002). Since these are expressed in thousands of barrels per day, we multiply 
by 365 times the 2001 mean weekly world oil price per barrel (EIA).  
Trade openness exports plus imports of goods and services as a share of GDP (WDI).  
Inflation log (1 + (annual % change in consumer prices/100)), data from WDI. 
International reserves over GDP IFS (1..SZF and AA.ZF) and WDI. 
Civil war 1 for civil war, 0 otherwise (Gleditsch, 2004).  
Coup d’etat  number of extraconstitutional or forced changes in the top government 
elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power structure (Banks' Cross-National 
Time-Series Data Archive). Unsuccessful coups are not counted. 
Natural disasters nr. of large disasters ( ≥ 0.5% of pop. affected, or damage ≥ 0.5% of 
GDP, or ≥ 1 death per 10000, criteria established by the IMF). From WHO CRED. 
Geological disasters: earthquakes, landslides, volcano eruptions, tidal waves; Climatic 
disasters: floods, droughts, extreme temperatures, wind storms; Human disasters: 
famines, epidemics. 
 
Appendix B Panel unit root and panel cointegration tests 
The long-run equilibrium equation underlying equation (1) can be written as follows: 
)2()+++(1=
,,
'
1,,     tititi
'
iti ηxβτθγλ
y  
where iγ  is a country-specific fixed effect and tiτ ,  is an N × 1 vector of N country-
specific time trends. Note that both the constant and the coefficient on the time trend 
are allowed to vary across countries. This is due to the fact that we left the country-
specific fixed effect in equation (1) unrestricted. Therefore, it captures a country-
specific constant in both the levels and the differenced equation. The first is 
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represented by iγ  in equation (2), while the second implies a country-specific linear 
time trend in the levels equation (2), which is captured by ti' τθ , .35  
Equation (1) allows us to estimate the long-run relationship in equation (2) if tiy ,  
and tix ,  are cointegrated. This implies that the individual variables are integrated of 
order 1 and the residuals of a regression of tiy ,  on tix ,  are stationary. To test this, we 
first performed panel unit root tests on both the levels and the differences of the 
individual variables in tiy ,  and tix ,  and then performed a panel cointegration test. 
The results are reported in Table B.1. We use the parametric panel unit root test by 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, IPS hereafter) and the non-parametric test by Maddala 
and Wu (1999, MW hereafter). Both tests are based on augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests for the individual series in the panel and allow the test statistic to vary 
across groups. Under the null, all groups have a unit root while under the alternative 
one or more groups do not have a unit root.36 Also, while IPS is designed for balanced 
panels, MW can be used for both balanced and unbalanced panels. We therefore 
report the test results of IPS for balanced panels, MW for balanced panels, and MW 
for unbalanced panels.37 For the differences, the tests always reject the null of non-
stationarity at 1 percent significance, which confirms that the variables are stationary 
in differences. For the level variables, the IPS test does not reject the null of non-
stationarity, except for inflation. However, the MW tests for balanced and unbalanced 
panels reject the null of non-stationarity in most of the cases. It is important to note 
that rejection of the null does not mean that all series in the panel are stationary, but 
that at least one of the series is stationary. It is therefore possible that the tests reject 
                                               
35
 To limit the number of regressors in the cointegration test, we leave out the regional time dummies.  
36
 The oil import price index equals either zero or the world oil price index, which does not vary across oil importing countries. 
Therefore, a panel unit root test is inappropriate and we use a Dickey-Fuller test on the world oil price index instead.  
37
 The unbalanced sample is the sample for which all the long-run variables are available, while the balanced sample includes 41 
countries for which the long-run variables are available for (a minimum of) 42 years.     
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non-stationarity while most of the series are in fact non-stationary. To determine the 
proportion of countries for which non-stationarity is rejected, we performed 
(augmented) Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for the individual countries. Next to the test 
statistics, Table B.1 reports the number of countries for which the individual ADF test 
rejects the null of stationarity at 5%, as a ratio of the total number of countries in the 
sample. The results show that for the vast majority of countries, the ADF tests do not 
reject non-stationarity in the levels variables, while rejecting non-stationarity in the 
differenced variables. It therefore seems justified to assume the variables are 
integrated of order 1. We next perform a panel cointegration test, as suggested by 
Pedroni (1999). We first run the following regression for each country separately: 
)3(+++= '210     ttt εxαρααy  
where ty  is log real GDP per capita in year t, ρ  is a time trend, and tx  is a vector of 
long-run GDP determinants (trade openness, inflation, international reserves, the 
commodity export price index, and the oil import price index). This allows for 
country-specific fixed effects, country-specific time trends and country-specific 
coefficients for the long-run GDP determinants. We collect the residuals from these 
regressions and run ADF regressions for each country. Following Pedroni (1999), we 
allow the lag order of the dependent variable to vary across countries by including the 
lags that enter significant at 10 percent. We then calculate the mean ADF t-statistic, 
derive the group t-statistic, and express it in the form of equation (2) on p. 665 in 
Pedroni (1999). Table B.1 reports this standard normally distributed group t-statistic. 
We strongly reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration and thus conclude that the 
variables are cointegrated.38 
 
                                               
38
 Intuitively, a rejection of the null hypothesis implies that a sufficiently large number of individual cross-sections have statistics 
that differ substantially from the means predicted by theory were they to be generated under the null.  
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Table B.1 Panel unit root and panel cointegration tests 
 Panel unit root tests 
 Im, Pesaran, Shin, balanced sample Maddala and Wu, balanced sample Maddala and Wu, full sample 
 Levels Differences Levels Differences Levels Differences 
GDP per capita (log) -1.16 7/41 -3.72*** 34/41 121.7*** 7/41 453.6***  34/41 261.1 11/131 1488.5***  91/131 
Trade to GDP -1.36  3/41 -6.01***  41/41 77.03 3/41 1415.7*** 41/41 353.0***  12/131 3593.4***  117/131 
Inflation (log) -2.22***  3/41 -4.83***  40/41 120.3***  3/41 698.2***  40/41 642.2***  16/131 1962.4***  102/130 
Reserves to GDP -1.65  7/41 -4.75***  39/41 132.5***  7/41 864.0***  39/41 349.7***  15/131 1918.1***  101/131 
Commodity export price index -1.64  4/41 -4.96***  41/41 125.8***  4/41 1251.1***  41/41 478.9***  19/131 3064.9***  118/131 
 Dickey-Fuller, balanced Dickey-Fuller, unbalanced   
 Levels Differences Levels Differences   
Oil import price index -1.62 -6.88*** -1.52 -7.10***   
 Panel cointegration test 
  Pedroni, full sample   
Group t-Statistic, N(0,1)  -5.67***   
Notes: Table B.1 reports the results of the panel unit root and panel cointegration tests. For the panel unit root tests, we report both the test statistic and the ratio of the number of countries for which the individual 
(augmented) Dickey-Fuller test rejects the null of stationarity at 5% to the total number of countries in the sample. The test statistics correspond to the t-bar statistic in Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), the Fisher χ2 test 
statistic in Maddala and Wu (1999), and the group t-statistic, expressed in the form of equation (2) on p. 665 in Pedroni (1999).  We included a constant but no trend in the panel unit root tests.  Since equation (2) 
includes a time trend, we also ran the panel unit root tests for GDP per capita with a trend and found similar results. The choice of lag order in the panel unit root tests was based on a pooled (augmented) Dickey-fuller 
regression with fixed effects, except for the oil import price index, for which we ran an ordinary (augmented) Dickey-Fuller regression. The number of lags is 1, 0, 2, 1, 1, and 0 for GDP per capita, trade to GDP, 
inflation, reserves to GDP, the commodity export price index, and the oil import price index, respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
